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Abstract
The extent to which remuneration systems affect the behaviour of health care professionals is  
of  considerable  importance  in  the  administration  of  publicly  funded  heath  care  systems. 
Using  data  across  two  jurisdictions  in  the  United  Kingdom,  in  only  one  of  which  
remuneration was changed, we compare the extent of measured dental activity at the dentist  
level in order to ascertain the impact of moving to activity-based remuneration. We find that  
there  are large  and statistically  significant  increases  in  activity  as  dentists  moved to  the  
activity-based  system  and  that  a  dentist’s  previous  form  of  contract  is  an  important  
determinant  of  the magnitude of  the effect.  We also explore the extent  to  which dentists’ 
professional attitudes can explain differences in their activity and find that some aspects of  
self-reported attitudes are associated with observable differences in activity.
 1 Introduction
A recurring concern in considering the administration of publicly-funded health care systems 
is  the impact  that  different  payment  methods have on the behaviour  of  health  providers. 
Within the economics literature these issues are often analysed in terms of the Principal-
Agent framework within which a distinction can be made between fixed payments, such as 
salaries, variable payments that are based on effort expended, which in a health care setting is 
often measured by the number and type of treatments given, and payments based on output, 
which  in  a  health  care  setting  corresponds  to  the  throughput  of  patients.  Fixed  salary 
payments,  for example,  are  deemed useful  when the providers  of a  service already have 
objectives  that  are  closely  aligned  with  those  of  the  purchaser  or  employer.  In  such 
circumstances  the  agent  can  be  induced  to  behave  in  the  principal’s  interest  by  simply 
ensuring that it is worth working. Treatment-based payment, which is often associated with 
the term Fee-for-Service  in a health care setting, provides strong incentives to increase the 
complexity and cost of treatment given to each individual patient. Activity-based payment, 
which is associated with a number of terms, such as  Prospective Payment in health care, 
provides incentives to increase the number of patients treated.  
A characteristic of payments based on numbers of patients treated is that they require the 
measurement of patient flows and have thus given rise to a focus on measuring and assessing 
the  cost  of  the  output  or  activity of  health  care  providers.  A very  large  literature  in 
Economics, of which  McGuire (2000) and Chalkley & Malcomson (2000) provide useful 
summaries, has developed to consider the trade-offs between quality and cost of care that 
result from these different incentives whilst literatures have developed in management and 
administration to consider the practical implications of activity-based financing, examples of 
which are to be found in Biørn et al. 2003; N�rgaard & Pallesen (2003) and Kennedy & 
Affleck-Graves (2006). 
This  paper  is  concerned  with  analysing  data  with  a  view to  establishing  how a  shift 
towards activity based payments has affected the measurable activity of dentists in the UK 
National  Health  Service  (NHS).  The  publicly  administered  NHS  finances  a  substantial 
proportion of dental health care and has faced a number of difficulties regarding perceived or 
real restrictions on access to publicly funded dentists, and a consequent increase in private 
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dentistry. These concerns are documented, for example, by Boulos & Phillipps (2004) and 
Hancock, Calnan & Manley (1999).  Whilst  it  is common to describe the UK as a single 
jurisdiction, the NHS is organised and administered separately in the constituent countries. 
For the purposes of the present study it is useful to consider Scotland and England & Wales2 
as two administrative units. Across all regions of the UK there have been concerns that a key 
reason for  restricted  access  to  publicly funded dentistry is  the level  and structure  of  the 
traditional, Fee-for-Service NHS dental contract,  which operated throughout the UK from 
1948  until  2006.  In  Scotland  the  traditional  Fee-for-Service  contract  has  continued  to 
dominate whilst prior to April 2006 alternative funding mechanisms had been experimented 
with in England & Wales. Of particular relevance for the current study was a mechanism 
termed the Personal Dental Service (PDS) which rewarded dentists with a payment that was 
closer  to  a  fixed  salary  than  Fee-for-Service.  As  a  consequence  of  continuing  concerns 
regarding access to NHS services a major change occurred in April 2006: a new NHS dental 
contract was introduced specifically in England & Wales. Under the new contract the dentists 
were paid to deliver a fixed volume of dental treatment, measured by a weighted sum of the 
courses  of  treatment  completed  each  year.  Remuneration  of  deviations  from the  agreed 
volume is negotiated ex post with the effect that dentists’ earnings will reflect their aggregate 
activity and the new contract specifies the measurement of Units of Dental Activity (UDA). In 
Scotland  changes  to  the  structure  of  the  traditional  Fee-for-Service  dental  contract  are 
currently under consideration, but as at the time of writing dentists continue to be paid under 
the predominantly Fee-for-Service arrangement.  
A key issue for policy makers when considering payment reforms is  the extent of the 
impact  that  different  purchasing  mechanisms  have  on  the  quantity  of  services  that  are 
provided and,  although the theoretical  literature referenced above is vast,  there remains a 
dearth  of  empirical  evidence  of  the  crucial  policy “treatment  effect”.  The  RAND study, 
summarised  for  example  by  Newhouse  & Group  (1993),  remains  unique  in  scale  as  an 
example of a controlled experiment in the realm of health care finance. And whilst supply-
side policy interventions of the kind considered in this paper are relatively commonplace, the 
most  celebrated probably being the adoption by Medicare of Prospective Payment  in  the 
2  Our grouping of England & Wales reflects the similarity in the arrangements for financing dental health care 
in these two countries rather than their NHS organisational structures which are now constitutionally 
separated.
2
1980’s, they are seldom introduced with a view to establishing controls for the purposes of 
statistical  analysis.  The  requirements  to  treat  individuals,  be  they patients  or  health  care 
practitioners, equitably means that “natural experiments” in the realm of health care financing 
policy are seemingly rare. 
In this paper we utilise the natural experiment of the change in dental contract in England 
and Wales,  with Scotland (where the contract  did not change) as a control,  to assess the 
impact  of  the  resultant  move  to  activity-based  financing  on  both  the  overall  volume  of 
treatments and the measure of dentists’ activity derived from the contractual arrangements –
UDA.  Our  data  provides  the  details  of  the  number  and  UDA values  of  the  treatments 
undertaken by a sample of 98 dentists who are practising in one or other of the two NHS 
jurisdictions of Scotland or England and Wales and covers a period from 6 months prior to 
the change of contract in England in Wales until 7 months after that contract change. We are 
thus able to adopt a difference-in-differences methodology to provide empirical estimates of 
the impact of this particular policy intervention. The institutional environment that we are 
studying offers a rich set of potential comparisons because we observe one region where a 
previously dichotomous financing regime changes to a new unified one, and a control region 
in which one financing regime persists.
In  health  care  it  is  often  suggested  that  institutional  arrangements  are  diverse  and 
instrumental in determining outcomes (see, for example, Gaynor, Rebitzer & Taylor, 2004). 
Hence, in Section2we provide a more detailed overview of the institutional setting and the 
changing contractual arrangements of our natural  experiment.  In Section3we consider the 
implications  of  a  simple  agency model  in  regard  to  the  contractual  change,  and  then  in 
Section4we summarise  our  data  and the  empirical  methods  that  we apply to  those  data, 
specifically  by  estimating  a  number  of  difference-in-differences  models  which  allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity across the individual dentists whose treatments we observe. The 
results of the empirical investigation are reported in Section5and6.
 2 Remuneration of dentists in the UK NHS
Dentists in the UK NHS are predominantly self-employed professionals and thus rely on 
service contract, rather than an employment contract, to mediate their arrangements with the 
relevant NHS purchasing authority. It is convenient to abstract from the often intricate 
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realities of NHS provision and assume that for the period covered by our study there were 
essentially two contracts: the General Dental Service (GDS) and the Personal Dental Service 
(PDS) contract. 
Dentists with a GDS contract were almost exclusively self-employed and could provide 
services both privately and for the NHS. The GDS contract specified a traditional Fee-for-
Service arrangement wherein dentists billed the NHS (or, where they were subject to co-
payment,  their  patients  and  the  NHS)  for  each  item of  treatment  carried  out,  and  also 
contained some limited capitation payments for each patient registered. Historically fees for 
each treatment item were set so as to recompense a dentist for time and other inputs required 
to carry it out. Over time, however, technical progress and productivity changes have led to 
individual item fees becoming distorted relative to their original values and whilst there was 
active review of fees up until 1996, since then they have only been re-based in relation to the 
general  price  level.  A small  number  of  dentists  in  Scotland  worked  under  the  GDS but 
actually received a salary. For these dentists the items of treatment that they perform are still 
recorded but do not contribute to their remuneration. We refer to them henceforth as Salaried 
GDS.
PDS  schemes  were  first  established  in  1998  and  initially  encompassed  a  number  of 
different  payment  mechanisms  but  by  2004  a  Department  of  Health  paper  (DH  2004) 
reported  that  PDS contracts  were  increasingly moving towards  an  arrangement  in  which 
dentists received a fixed annual contract value. There were various requirements in terms of 
dentists providing a commitment of time to the NHS and there was monitoring of the number 
of patients being cared for (the practice list size) and some patient outcomes, i.e. the time that 
patients waited for treatment. Whilst there was measurement of dentists’ activity under PDS 
the  link  between  activity  and  payment  was  relatively  weak  and  in  many  cases  PDS 
arrangements can be likened to a form of salaried employment – dentists received a payment 
provided they performed their NHS duties but the extent of that payment did not depend 
directly on the volume of those duties.
In understanding the NHS dental system and the contractual mechanisms that we study the 
Course  of  Treatment (CoT)  is  a  key  concept. Under  the  GDS,  the  treatment  items 
(examinations, fillings, extractions etc.) required to restore the dental health of a particular 
patient were accumulated into the CoT. Dentists under the GDS were, and in Scotland still 
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are, paid for each item of treatment within a CoT but claimed for payment only once the CoT 
was complete. Thus, the administrative unit of account within NHS dentistry was the CoT 
and both GDS and PDS dentists  had their  CoTs recorded.  Importantly for our study,  the 
details of treatment items for each CoT were retained even when, as in the PDS contract, they 
did  not  impact  on  the  dentists  remuneration,  the  reason  for  this  being  that  there  is  a 
substantial element of patient cost-sharing for NHS dental services and a patient’s liability 
was  determined  in  relation  to  the  treatment  items  they  received,  however  their  dentist 
happened to be paid. 
The existence of data relating to CoTs in part informed the movement to a new contracting 
regime in England & Wales. One measure of a dentist’s activity that was readily available 
within the NHS was the number of CoTs that a dentist provided in a month or year. Of course 
some CoTs correspond to patients already in good dental health and represent only a little 
activity, whilst other CoTs record the treatment of initially dentally unfit patients and thus 
represent a great deal of activity. For the reform of contracting in England &Wales it was 
decided  to  categorise  CoTs  into  four  bands and  to  give  them weights  according  to  the 
treatments included in  the CoT.  The weights were normalised so that the simplest  CoTs, 
where a patient’s teeth are examined and cleaned but deemed not to require further treatment 
is assigned one Unit of Dental Activity (UDA) and more complex CoTs are given multiple 
UDA values according to, on average, how much extra activity they entail. The classification 
system and associated weights are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Course of Treatment, Bands and UDAs
CoT Band Description of Treatment Item(s) within CoT UDA 
Value
1 Routine examination, scaling and diagnostic procedures 1.0
1 (urgent) One of a specified set of possible treatments provided to a patient in 
circumstances where: 
prompt care and treatment is provided because, in the opinion of the 
dental practitioner, that person’s oral health is likely to deteriorate 
significantly or the person is in severe pain by reason of their oral 
condition; or
care and treatment is only provided to the extent that it is necessary to 
prevent that significant deterioration or address that severe pain
1.2
2 Fillings and extractions 3.0
3 Treatment requiring laboratory work 12.0
Under what has become called the New Dental Contract dentists agree to deliver a number of 
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UDAs, each year in return for an annual income determined as the product of the price and 
number of UDAs they will supply. In a transitional period the price of a UDA for any dentists 
is determined so as to ensure that they are remunerated no less than under their previous 
contract, for the same level of activity. In future it is intended that local purchasers will 
negotiate prices with dentists and will reflect local conditions and priorities, i.e. may choose 
to set higher (lower) prices in areas of greater (lesser) need. The arrangements to adjust the 
overall contract value in response to over- or under-provision of UDAs by a dentist are 
complex and depend on the extent of any discrepancy. However, in essence the new system 
sets a price per UDA and with some degree of latitude the overall remuneration of a dentist 
will vary with the number of UDAs they provide. Both in terminology and in effect the new 
contractual arrangement in England & Wales is activity-based. In Scotland, dentists continue 
to work under treatment-based GDS contract.
The  contractual  basis  of  NHS dental  provision  in  England  & Wales  and  Scotland  is 
summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: Contracts for NHS Dental Services
Contract Basis of Payment Period and Jurisdiction of operation
GDS Items of Treatment, claimed by 
CoT
England &Wales:  -- April 2006
Scotland: -- Present 
PDS
Salaried GDS
Overall Service Delivery England & Wales : 1998 – April 2006
Scotland: N/A
England: N/A
Scotland: -- Present
New Dental 
Contract
Units of Dental Activity England & Wales : April 2006 – Present 
 3 Agency theory and dental contracts
Agency models, for which Laffont & Martimort (2001) provide an overview of the relevant 
literature, analyse the impact of the incentives that are provided by different reward structures 
usually assumed to be designed by single decision maker – the Principal, on the behaviour of 
another decision maker – the Agent. Principal-agent theory has developed to a great degree of 
sophistication to  account  for different  institutional  constraints,  complexities of  task to be 
carried out and information structures but here we are only concerned with understand how 
different  forms a  dental  remuneration contract  may influence  the amount  of  activity that 
dentists are observed to engage in. We thus use a very simple framework in the spirit of a 
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principal-agent theory without invoking the intricacies. 
The  approach  we take  is  to  consider  from the  perspective  of  a  third  party  purchaser 
(principal) the implications for the extent of what we term the effort of a dentist (agent), of 
rewarding  the  dentist  in  different  ways,  corresponding  to  the  different  contracts  that  are 
summarised in Table 2. We consider a dentist determining the effort, henceforth denoted e , to 
devote to treating NHS patients over the course of a given time period – for example, a year. 
Following a long tradition in the application of agency theory in health economics (see, for 
example, McGuire, 2000) we assume that a dentist is altruistic at least to the extent that they 
derive some positive utility from providing treatment  to their  patients  and that  they also 
derive utility from money income which w will denote by  Y . Hence, we write a dentist’s 
utility as
( , )U e Y
and  assume  that  the  function  (.)U  is  concave,  increasing  in  Y and  initially  increasing 
(eventually decreasing) in  e .  For simplicity we will  assume here that  the only source of 
income for the dentist is their NHS contract and distinguish between the 3 alternatives in 
Table 2 by defining,
( )
( )
G
P
N
Y f e
Y Y
Y pA e
=
=
=
where:  ,  and G P NY Y Y  denote the incomes generated under the GDS, PDS and new contract 
respectively,  Y  is  a  fixed sum,  p is  the  price associated  with  delivering  each  UDA and 
(.) and (.)f A  are increasing concave functions. The functions (.) and A(.)f  capture the fact 
that by expending more effort the dentist will carry out more treatment items thus increasing 
payment under the GDS, or will generate more units of activity, thus increasing income from 
the new dental contract.
The optimal levels of effort under each of the three possible contracts are defined by the 
first order conditions 
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' 0
0
' 0.
Y e
e
Y e
dU U f U
de
dU U
de
dU pU A U
de
= + =
= =
= + =
and we denote the corresponding levels of effort, * * *,  and G P Ne e e  respectively. 
On  the  assumptions  thus  far  made  it  follows  that  * * * * and  G P N Pe e e e> > but  that  the 
relationship between  * * and  G Ne e is ambiguous and depends on the details  of the functions
(.) and A(.)f . The relationship between effort and  activity is captured in the function  (.)A  
and hence a formal consideration of incentives under the three possible contracts suggests the 
following:  both  the  activity-based  (new  contract)  and  the  fee-for-service  GDS  contracts 
provide a stronger incentive for increased activity relative to the fixed income PDS, but it is 
not clear which of activity-based or fee-for-service payment gives the strongest incentive. 
The agency framework set out above has been couched in terms of a single dentist. In 
practice it  would be reasonable to assume that each of the functions  (.), (.) and (.)U f A is 
determined in part  by a particular  dentist’s  personal characteristics,  motivation,  economic 
circumstances and patient mix. Thus what might hold for dentist X may not hold for dentist 
Y, either in terms of the magnitude of any effect from switching contracts or in terms of the 
relative strength of incentives towards greater activity entailed in the GDS and new contract. 
The  agency  model  suggests  not  only  that  the  impact  of  activity-based  financing  is  an 
empirical  issue  but  also  that  any  empirical  assessment  will  need  to  take  into  account 
variations across individual dentists. Our empirical methodology is chosen so as to take note 
of these insights.
The framework considered here is simple and abstracts from many of the practical issues 
affecting the performance of a complex profession, such as dentistry, within a complicated 
institution such as the NHS. Dentists in practice may consider the impact of their treatment 
decisions over several time periods, they will face many dimensions to those decisions, such 
as quality of care, patient selection and so on and they will operate according to both personal 
and professional constraints. The contractual arrangements in the NHS do not in reality lend 
themselves to simple mathematical expressions such as those of equations . Nevertheless, 
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these additional complexities will  not remove ambiguities but rather add to them. In this 
sense at least the simple agency model we have used is robust.
 4 Data and empirical framework
Our study is concerned with a cohort of 98 dentists split across the jurisdictions of Scotland 
and England & Wales  who are  the  subject  of  a  long term investigation  into the  origins, 
development and impact of professional attitudes. Our sample dentists are all at a similar 
stage of their professional development, having recently completed the final stage of their 
training. They are a part of a study that is intended to achieve a better understanding of the 
effect of dentists’ preferences, professional attitudes and beliefs on the numbers of patients 
treated and the treatments provided. These dentists have all responded to questionnaires and 
we utilise some of their responses in Section6.
Whilst these dentists are subject to ongoing study in order to monitor their attitudes, they 
can also be identified for the purposes of linking to administrative records concerning the 
treatments that they perform in the NHS. These administrative data are described in greater 
detail  by  Chalkley  &  Tilley  (2005;  2006)  but  as  discussed  in  Section2a  key  unit  of 
observation is the CoT. In particular for each dentist in each month we observe the number of 
CoTs for which that  dentist  was either  eligible  for payment  or was  credited with having 
conducted. Under GDS arrangements it is also possible to recover the precise details of which 
treatment items were included in each and every CoT. Following the adoption of the new 
contract in England & Wales the administrative system ceased to record this level of detail 
but does record the Band into which each CoT falls. As a part of our study we retrospectively 
‘banded’ all CoT for all dentists by taking the definitions of Bands and running an algorithm 
to assign each CoT to a Band based on the included treatment items. The result is a data set 
that records the Band of every individual CoT delivered by each dentist. 
The 98 dentists delivered a total of over 170,000 CoTs during October 2005 to November 
2006 and Table 3 shows the distribution of those CoTs across jurisdictions and the dentist’s 
basis of payment. 
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Table 3: Courses of treatment by contract3
October 2005 - 
March 2006
April 2006 - 
November 2006
Total
Salaried General Dental 
Service (Scotland)
527 629 1,156
Non salaried General Dental 
Service (Scotland)
22,259 34,475 56,734
General Dental Service 
(England & Wales)
25,183 32,866 58,049
Personal Dental Service 
(England & Wales)
19,314 35,231 54,545
Trust led Dental Services 
(England & Wales)
0 740 740
Total 67,283 103,941 171,224
Our purpose is to examine the extent to which a change in contract, and specifically a 
move towards activity-based remuneration, impacts upon dentists’ activity as measured by 
UDAs. Over any period of time changes in demand for dental services, professional standards 
and  other  factors  might  affect  dental  activity.  In  addition  the  agency  framework  that  is 
summarised  in  Section3suggested  that  dentist  specific  characteristics  will  influence  the 
activity of any particular dentist. In order to control for as many of these various factors as 
possible, given our data, we utilise the following regression model,
( )it S S S S i ity j c j c xα β γ δ λ µ ε= + + + + + +
where ity  denotes the UDA measure of dental activity provided by dentist i  in month t ; j  
denotes the jurisdiction of the dentist  (England & Wales is the omitted category);  c  is a 
dummy variable  which  takes  the  value  1  if  the  observation  is  after  April  2006  and  0 
otherwise;  x  is a vector of monthly dummy variables;  iµ  denotes a dentist specific effect; 
and itε  denotes an idiosyncratic error.
The coefficient on the interaction between the jurisdiction and contract change dummy 
variables,  Sδ ,  is  a  difference-in-differences estimator  of  the  change  in  contract.  This 
difference-in-differences estimator accounts for changes in the dental activity measure over 
time that are unrelated to the change in contract such as a general improvement in oral health. 
In addition, it accounts for fixed unobserved differences between countries such as the level 
3  TDS dentists are employed by PCTs. PDS dentists are typically paid a fixed annual contract value in return 
for a level of service. 
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of  oral  health.  The difference-in-differences estimator,  therefore,  controls  for  both group-
specific and time-specific effects, see Blundell & Dias (2002)
Under  certain  assumptions  the  difference-in-differences  methodology  enables  us  to 
identify the impact of the change in contract in England and Wales. For example, if we only 
had information from dentists in England, we would not be able to determine whether any 
change in UDAs per month was because of the new contract or because of a secular trend in 
treatment need such as improving oral health. Similarly, if we only had information after the 
change on contract, we would not be able to tell whether the difference between England & 
Wales and Scotland was because of the contract or because of some unobserved difference, 
perhaps in oral health, between the jurisdictions. 
 5 Results: the impact of activity-based pay
The difference-in-differences estimator in Equation (4) is only unbiased if the trend in the 
outcome variable is the same in England & Wales and Scotland.  Figure 1 shows that the 
activity of dentists in England & Wales and Scotland is almost identical between October 
2005  and  February  2006.  Thus,  we  can  be  reasonably  confident  that  the  difference-in-
differences estimator will be unbiased. 
Figure 1 also shows that the activity of dentists in Scotland, as measured by the mean 
number  of  UDAs per  month,  is  about  the  same before  and after  the change in  contract. 
However, the activity of dentists in England & Wales increases a little after April 2006. Thus 
the activity of dentists in England & Wales seems to have increased relative to the activity of 
dentists in Scotland after the introduction of the new dental contract in England & Wales. 
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Figure 1: Mean UDAs per dentist-month
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The graphical analysis is formalised by estimating equation  and Table 4 reports the results 
of this fixed effects panel regression model for the period October 2005 to November 2006. 
The difference-in-differences coefficient shows that, compared with dentists in Scotland, the 
activity of dentists in England & Wales increased significantly:  the number of UDAs per 
month increased by 71 UDAs per dentist per month. This is equivalent to a 26% increase in 
the number of UDAs per dentist per month compared with the mean number of UDAs before 
the contract change.
Table 4: Regression results
Coefficient Robust SE t P>t
Nov-05 -5.811 13.189 -0.440 0.660
Dec-05 -100.570 14.266 -7.050 0.000
Jan-06 -8.802 16.640 -0.530 0.598
Feb-06 -17.526 16.347 -1.070 0.286
Mar-06 -49.550 18.581 -2.670 0.009
Apr-06 omitted category
May-06 10.632 19.144 0.560 0.580
Jun-06 -40.431 20.644 -1.960 0.053
Jul-06 -62.166 21.028 -2.960 0.004
Aug-06 -30.696 25.114 -1.220 0.225
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Coefficient Robust SE t P>t
Sep-06 -31.944 23.462 -1.360 0.177
Oct-06 -28.344 21.764 -1.300 0.196
Nov-06 -40.293 23.002 -1.750 0.083
Sβ omitted category
γ 71.822 24.503 2.930 0.004
Sδ -71.082 19.462 -3.650 0.000
constant 347.514 12.133 28.640 0.000
Sample size
Number of dentists
R-squared (overall)
F(14,97)
Prob > F
The results in Table 4 assume that all dentists in England & Wales were paid in exactly the 
same way both before and after  April  2006. However,  by using the detailed information 
available to this project it is possible to estimate the impact of the introduction of activity-
based pay on UDAs according to each dentist’s contract before April 2006. The first row in 
Table 5 estimates equation 4 for all dentists and thus repeats the difference-in-differences 
estimate in  Table 4. The second row estimates equation 4 for only GDS dentists. The third 
row estimates equation 4 for only PDS dentists. 
Table 5 shows that the difference-in-differences estimates vary according to a dentist’s 
previous contract. The introduction of activity-based pay had a much larger impact on the 
activity  of  dentists  whose  remuneration  was  salary-based  (PDS  dentists)  rather  than 
treatment-based (GDS dentists). The number of observations on which the estimates in Table
5 are based is relatively small but, nevertheless, the results for the PDS dentists are relatively 
large  and  significant:  the  activity  of  former  PDS dentists  increased  by 128.2  UDAs per 
dentist-month,  or  41.2%  compared  with  before  April  2006  (311.128).  By  contrast,  the 
difference-in-differences estimator for former GDS dentists is not significantly different from 
zero. 
Table 5: Difference in differences estimates by contract
Coef. Robust SE t P>t Dentists Observations
GDS, PDS, TDS
sδ -71.082 19.462 -3.650 0.000 98 1216
GDS
sδ -11.976 25.185 -0.480 0.636 55 706
PDS
sδ -128.207 22.670 -5.660 0.000 47 599
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 6 Results: an analysis of dentist specific effects
In order to reflect the Agency framework outlined in Section3, the empirical framework 
used fixed effects regression models to account for unobserved dentist specific heterogeneity. 
This  section  explores  these fixed effects  in  more detail.  First,  we assess  the  explanatory 
power and distribution of these fixed effects. Second, by linking these fixed effects to the 
responses obtained from the psychological questionnaire, we examine the extent to which 
these dentist specific effects reflect the attitudes of the dentists in the sample. In particular, 
we use a subset of these responses, which relate to the dentists’ sense of professional identity, 
to try and explain the variation in the dentist specific effects.4 To our knowledge, this is the 
first time that such a multidisciplinary approach has been adopted. 
In order to assess the explanatory power of the dentist specific effects, we compared the 
adjusted-R2s of regressions with and without fixed effects. An OLS regression of the number 
of UDAs per month on the set of monthly dummy variables yielded an adjusted-R2 of 0.0387. 
However,  accounting for dentist  specific  effects  by including a dummy variable  for each 
dentist in the sample increased the adjusted R2 to 0.5953. An F-test that all the dentist specific 
effects were jointly equal to zero was rejected. Thus, dentist specific effects have a significant 
role to play in explaining variation in the number of UDAs per month. 
4  A more complete analysis of those data is currently being undertaken.
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Figure 2: The distribution of fixed effects
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of these fixed effects (Table 4 reports the difference-in-
differences results). This illustrates that, in general, there is more variation in the fixed effects 
from dentists in England & Wales than from dentists in Scotland. 
The mean fixed effect is lower in England & Wales than in Scotland. This suggests that, 
other  things equal,  dentists  in England & Wales tend to  provide fewer UDAs per month 
compared with dentists in Scotland. This difference in the mean fixed effect per dentist may 
result from a number of factors such as the different types of patient treated by each dentist. 
As a result, a dentist who treats patients that require more UDAs will, other things equal, 
have a higher fixed effect. 
The objective in the remainder of this paper is to examine the extent to which the variation 
in these estimated fixed effects is associated with each dentist’s attitudes as measured by their 
responses to the psychological questionnaire. 
One section of the psychological questionnaire examined how treatment impacts upon a 
dentist’s  sense  of  professional  identity.  In  order  to  create  a  measure  for  the  value  of 
professional identity, dentists were asked to rank on a scale of 1 (not important) to 7 (very 
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important) how important it is to be:
(a) someone who is doing what they need to do;
(b) a caring dentist;
(c) a competent dentist; and 
(d) an ethical dentist. 
Then, dentists were asked to rank, on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), 
how strongly they agreed with the following statements
• If  I  provide a  treatment that  is  best  for the patient,  no matter  what  the patient 
thinks, I will think of myself as
• someone who is doing what they need to do
• a caring dentist
• a competent dentist
• an ethical dentist
• If I provide a treatment that is best for my practice, no matter what anyone else 
thinks, I will think of myself as someone who is
• someone who is doing what they need to do
• a caring dentist
• a competent dentist
• an ethical dentist
• If I provide a treatment a patient wants, even if I do not believe they are right, I 
will think of myself as someone who is
• someone who is doing what they need to do
• a caring dentist
• a competent dentist
• an ethical dentist
• If I consider a patient’s ability to pay when making treatment decisions, I will think 
of myself as someone who is
• someone who is doing what they need to do
• a caring dentist
• a competent dentist
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• an ethical dentist
• If I consider how and what I am paid when making treatment decisions, I will think 
of myself as someone who is
• someone who is doing what they need to do
• a caring dentist
• a competent dentist
• an ethical dentist
The value of professional identity was calculated by multiplying the strength of agreement 
for each statement by its importance. For example, a respondent who thought that doing what 
they needed to do was ‘very important’ (7 on the importance scale) and who strongly agreed 
(7 on the agreement scale) that they would think of themselves as ‘someone who is doing 
what they need to do’ for each of the 5 scenarios would have a score of 245 (=7*(5*7)). 
The values associated with each of the four components of professional identity were used 
to  explain  the  variation  in  the  dentist  specific  effects.  The  results  of  this  regression  are 
reported in Table 6.5
Table 6: Fixed effects and dentists' preferences
Professional identity Coef. SE T P>t
Someone who is doing what they need to 
do
1.04 0.47905 2.17 0.03
An ethical dentist 0.48 0.94367 0.51 0.61
A competent dentist -0.48 0.97792 -0.5 0.62
A caring dentist -1.28 0.92926 -1.4 0.17
Constant 22.3 51.8053 0.43 0.67
N 81
F(4,76) 1.49
Prob > F 0.21
Adjusted-R2 0.02
Table 6 shows that the components of professional identity were not jointly significant and 
that they explained only 2% of the variation in the fixed effects. However, one component 
5  The responses used in the analysis were the post-intervention responses as this included the scenario: ‘if I 
consider how and what I am paid…’. The correlation between pre- and post-intervention component of 
professional identity was at least 0.96 for each component.
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was significant and related to the value of what a dentist  needs to do. The coefficient is 
positive which suggests that dentists who think that doing what they need to do is important 
have higher fixed effects i.e. provide more UDAs per month. Despite not being significant, it 
is noteworthy that dentists who think that being a caring dentist is important have lower fixed 
effects i.e. provide fewer UDAs per month. 
In other work we have found that a regression between these same psychological factors 
and the fixed effects from a regression with the number of CoTs per month as the dependent 
variable is significant. These results, which are available from the authors on request, are 
qualitatively similar to the results in Table 6. Taken together, these results suggest that there is 
merit in adopting a multidisciplinary approach to the analysis of incentives in health care. 
 7 Conclusion
As health system administrators consider reforming the way in which health professionals are 
paid, it  is important that they have evidence relating to the impact that different payment 
systems have in practice. Principal agent theory provides both a framework for understanding 
incentive effects and a guide to interpreting evidence and in this paper we have used that 
theory to interpret and assess data relating to a unique natural experiment in the UK NHS 
dental health care system. 
Utilising  a  difference-in-differences  methodology we have  shown that  the  adoption  of 
activity-based remuneration  for  dentists  led to  an increase in  activity,  as  evidenced by a 
upward shift relative to the trend in activity exhibited by dentists in a part of the NHS that 
were not subject to the change in contractual terms. The magnitude of the increase in activity 
depends on the form of remuneration that was in place prior to the activity-based contract. It 
is largest, over a 40% increase, for dentists who were closest to a salaried arrangement and is 
small  and not  statistically significant  for  those dentists  who were under  a  fee-for-service 
arrangement.
A distinctive  feature  of  our  data  is  that  it  enables  us  to  link  activity  measures  to 
questionnaire  responses  that  elicit  professional  attitudes  and  identity.  We  utilise  this 
additional information to asses how much of the variation in dentists’ activity is capable of 
being explained by their stated attitudes. Individual heterogeneity is very substantial in our 
data and explains almost 60% of the variability in observed performance of dentists. We find 
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that relatively little of this heterogeneity can be explained by professional attitudes but that 
which  can exhibits  some potentially interesting  avenues  of  future  research.  For  example, 
dentists who see themselves as responding to need tend to exhibit greater activity whilst those 
who view themselves as acting ethically tend to have lower activity, other things equal. An 
understanding of how professional attitudes are formed and evolve and how they might be 
influenced by policy interventions would provide a potential further avenue by which the 
performance of health care systems might be influenced.
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